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Self-Regulation vs.
Public Regulation
Profession Under Attack

By Carole Burgess and Larry N. Killough

Over the last several years the ac
counting profession has come under
attack from public interest groups, con
gressional committees, the press, and
business writers. However, accounting
is just one of several professions be
ing beseiged by the advocates of
public responsibility. To better under
stand accounting’s problems, it is im
portant to take a broad look at the
nature of American professions in the
late 20th century.
A profession is an institution and
possibly a monopoly; it must have a
definite purpose and require special
training. In order to comply with socie
ty’s requirements for a profession,
educational standards are established,
competency examinations are ad
ministered, and various codes govern
ing behavior are required. However,
below the surface, the professions suc
cessfully create a guild calling for
restraint of competition in the name of
better service to the public. The public
often views this as a move toward
elitism. Thus, the profession’s
members are set apart from the
general public and a monopoly is
created.1

Because a profession’s functions
center on public service, its members
are necessarily at the mercy of the
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public’s will. Society allows the profes
sion a limited set of privileges expec
ting the members to perform these
functions efficiently and effectively.
However, expecting a profession com
posed of individuals to act in a uniform
ly expert manner is unrealistic. There
will, inevitably, be superior perfor
mance by some members of a profes
sion, failures by others, and much
performance which falls into the me
dian between these two. Failure to
meet a changing society’s standards
leads to public displeasure and
sometimes distrust endangering the
profession’s privileges.2
The current public assault on the ac
counting profession is an outgrowth of
the Watergate investigations, cor
porate failures, frauds, and briberies
encountered in the early 1970s. These
events brought the attention of the
public and government to the business
community in general, and specifical
ly to the accounting profession. As a
result, Congress conducted several
investigations into the Securities Ex
change Commission’s (SEC) manage
ment of matters involving corporate
accountability, accounting, and
auditing.
The first Congressional report came
from Congressman John E. Moss’s
subcommittee in October 1976. They

concluded that the SEC should not
continue to rely on self-regulation in
the accounting profession because of
the Financial Accounting Standards
Board’s (FASB) tarnished image.
Similarly, the staff report prepared by
the late Senator Lee Metcalf for sub
committee hearings on the accounting
profession was critical of the SEC’s
oversight; it proposed that more
legislation was needed to regulate
accountants.
While Metcalf and other critics of the
accounting profession and the FASB
discussed federal standards for ac
counting and auditing, the American
Institute of CPA’s (AICPA) Commis
sion on Auditors Responsibilities (The
Cohen Commission) concluded that
the present combination of private and
government regulation effectively
maintained audit quality. However, the
Cohen Commission documented that
there was substantial room for im
provement in the area of self
regulation. As a result of the SEC’s
continued support of self-regulation,
the Metcalf subcommittee’s recom
mendations issued in November 1977
emphasized self-regulation for the ac
counting profession with SEC
oversight.

Structure For Self-Regulation
Following the 1977 Senate Subcom
mittee hearings, the accounting pro
fession was faced with either the pros
pect of revising its present regulatory
processes or submitting to public
regulation. The profession chose the
former option and formulated a selfregulatory plan through the AICPA.
The principal elements of the plan
were a SEC Practice Section
monitored by non-CPAs and peer
review.
The SEC Practice Section (SECPS)
is one of two sections created in 1977
when the AICPA established a Division
for CPA Firms. Membership in the
SECPS dictates that a firm follow rigid
quality control standards and meet
numerous requirements, including
peer review. An Executive committee
oversees the Section’s activities; it can
impose sanctions such as additional
continuing education requirements,
special peer reviews, censures, fines,
and expulsion from membership. The
Public Oversight Board (POB), in turn,
oversees the Executive Committee of
the SECPS.

Another element of the SECPS is a
special investigations committee (SIC).
The SIC examines evidence of al
leged audit failures and makes recom
mendations concerning further
investigation and sanctions to the Ex
ecutive Committee.
Members of both the SECPS and
the Private Companies Practice Sec
tion (PCPS) are required to undergo a
peer review every three years. The
purpose of peer review is to evaluate
a firm’s quality control system and
determine if there is reasonable
assurance that the firm is meeting pro
fessional standards. Accordingly, the
peer review process is the foundation
of self-regulation.
Before the peer review can begin,
the firm being reviewed prepares a
quality control document which
describes their quality control system
and checks for compliance with
prescribed measures by examining
working paper files and reports. Com
pliance with membership requirements
of the division for firms is also exam
ined during the review. At the conclu
sion of the review, a written report is
presented at a meeting called an exit
conference. Both the SECPS peer
review committee and the POB are
notified of upcoming exit conferences
involving members of the SECPS.

For self-regulation to be
effective, more than the self
interest of those regulated
must be considered.

Several rules have been estab
lished to govern the composition and
qualifications of those conducting
reviews. Review teams may be pro
vided by the AICPA, an association or
a state CPA society or one firm may
engage another. However, reciprocal
reviews are not allowed; the two firms
must be independent of each other.
Members of the review team must be
CPAs and be highly knowledgeable in
the reviewed firm’s specialty areas. In
addition to the work of the SECPS peer
review committee, the POB monitors
the peer review process.

The POB was forced to oversee the
activities of the SECPS. The composi
tion of the POB reflects the profes
sion’s desire to represent the users of
financial statements and to improve
public service. Of its five members,
four must be nonaccountants.
Because of the profession’s desire to
maintain a self-regulation program, the
POB has line authority. Its real power
results from the right to attend the
meetings and activities of every sec
tion committee and the duty to report
to the SEC and the public on the ade
quacy of the profession’s selfregulatory program.3 Specific POB
duties include consulting with SECPS
executive committee on current
issues, overseeing the peer reviews of
member firms, attending exit con
ferences, examining the investigative
efforts resulting from the SIC, and con
sulting with the SEC.
The AICPA’s formation of an SEC
practice section, a peer review pro
cess, and a POB has illustrated the
profession’s commitment to oversight
and quality control. However, the over
sight and peer review process require
that disciplinary bodies penalize those
who perform substandard work. The
failure of the oversight and peer review
process to adequately discipline the
profession is just one of the selfregulatory problems that remains to be
solved.4

Self-Regulation Problems
and Considerations
In order for self-regulation to be ef
fective, more than the self-interest of
those regulated must be considered.
A problem facing self-regulation is that
of overcoming the reservations of both
members of the profession and the
public. A few members of a profession
naturally resist all forms of regulation
while some citizens see private regula
tion as a collusion of members aiming
to deceive those who are supposed to
be served.5
Other matters which must be con
sidered are the misconceptions on the
part of the public and members of the
profession concerning self-regulation
and public regulation. Some in
dividuals expect to see a great deal of
activity, indicating that self-regulation
is functioning properly. However, the
activity level in a self-regulatory pro
cess is a less useful measure of con
trol than in public regulation. As
mentioned earlier, some members of

Public regulation emphasizes
punishment; self-regulation
stresses remedies and
avoidance.

the regulated profession will not
perceive a change from their
unregulated state and will be un
cooperative regarding new or formal
regulation.6
Further, problems can occur in the
relationship between the profession
being regulated and the group who is
responsible for oversight. A lack of at
tention to oversight leads to unques
tioned self-regulation; too much atten
tion can lead to public regulation.7
Perhaps, the biggest problem in the
current self-regulatory system is the
failure of the AICPA to make member
ship in the SECPS or PCPS man
datory. This failure is especially
noteworthy in light of the recent
decline in SECPS membership.
Reasons cited for this decline include
peer review costs and unwillingness to
undergo peer review.8 Without in
creased involvement in the division,
the profession’s commitment to over
sight and quality control is
questionable.
A final consideration involves the
level of competition in the profession.
While the number of accounting firms
has increased, the client base has re
mained essentially at the same level.
The result of firms’ efforts to maintain
or expand their client base has often
led to price cutting. Unfortunately, a
decline in the quality of service offered
has frequently accompanied these
price cutting measures.

Need For Proper Balance
Although public regulation and self
regulation are directed toward similar
ends, they vary significantly in the
means used to achieve those ends.
For example, requirements dictated by
public regulation are enforced through
state and federal authority; self
regulation can only invoke sanctions or
exclude members from group
benefits.9
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If self-regulation is to work, a
moral regeneration is needed.

While public regulation emphasizes
punishment for misconduct, self
regulation stresses remedies and
avoidance. One reason for this dif
ference in methods is that the public
demands intensified public regulation
after it perceives misconduct; in their
eyes punishment is viewed as a strong
deterrent. Self-regulation’s emphasis
on remedy is based on a desire to treat
the profession’s members fairly, in ad
dition to serving the public. It is felt that
the public is best served by dealing
with the cause of the problem.10

Prospects For the Future
A balance of private rights and
public responsibility is necessary to
measure how well professions meet
standards. According to Jacques Bar
zun in “The Professions Under
Siege,” long-time monopoly status has
caused professions to forget that their
privileges were given in return for
public benefit. In order to achieve a
balancing of private rights and public
responsibility. Barzun proposes that a
moral regeneration is needed. Moral
regeneration will not develop as a
result of internal minimum standards
or policing from the outside; it “can
come about only when the members
of a group feel once more confident
that ethical behavior is desirable, wide
ly
practiced,
approved,
and
admired.”11 Self-regulation of the ac
counting profession will be successful
only when it embraces these condi
tions wholeheartedly and unre
servedly.
Despite skepticism about regulation
and the quality of service offered by
the profession, the public and govern
ment want accountants to take more
responsibility to ensure the accoun
tability of major institutions. Thus, the
role of the accounting profession has
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expanded as corporate and govern
mental accountability have come
under the scrutiny of public interest
groups. The greater influence of the
accounting profession further arouses
its critics to demand stronger supervi
sion from the outside. “Thus, the ma
jor challenge facing the profession in
the next decade is to remain a self
regulating entity in the private sector
even as its public mission and respon
sibility grow.”12

Summary and Conclusions
In recent years there has been a
change in outsiders’ views of the ac
counting profession. No longer seeing
the profession as an institution
dedicated to quality service and in
tegrity, public interest groups, the
press, and congressional committees
have threatened the profession with
much more stringent regulation from
external sources. The accounting pro
fession has responded to such threats
by revising its self-regulatory program
to include the SECPS, peer review,
and the POB. Despite the various con
cerns from external sources about this
form of self-regulation, its goal of ser
vice parallels goals usually cited for
public regulation.
The accounting profession now finds
itself at a juncture. The FASB con
tinues to be criticized; self-regulation
has probably not worked as well as it
should because of practitioners’
resistance; and increased competition
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has led some to conclude that many
members have forgotten their primary
service responsibility.
If self-regulation is to work, a moral
regeneration is needed. Members
must once more believe that ethical
behavior is essential, that service is far
more important than market share or
profits, and that inferior performance
cannot be tolerated. Ω
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